

## Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 USIE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00

ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07 IO-10 L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02

OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15

TRSE-00 NSC-05 BIB-01 ERDE-00 /082 W

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O P 201746Z MAR 75

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0907

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

USCINCEUR PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0125

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: CONSOLIDATED PRESS TALKING POINTS ON LATEST

EASTERN PROPOSALS

1. ALTHOUGH EASTERN MEDIA HAVE NOT GIVEN LATEST EASTERN PROPOSAL, OFFICIALLY TABLED IN PLENARY SESSION OF MARCH 6 AND IMMEDIATELY LEAKED TO PRESS, AS EXTENSIVE TREATMENT AS THEY DID PREVIOUS "FREEZE" LEAK, PUBLICATION HAS APPARENTLY CREATED SOME CONFUSION AMONG WESTERN MEDIA AS TO TRUE MEANING OF PROPOSALS.

2. AUTHORITATIVE TASS MARCH 14 ITEM DISSEMINATED IN ENGLISH RED STAR ARTICLE, MARCH 15, AND NEUES DEUTSCHLAND OF MARCH 16-17 CLEARLY SPELL OUT DETAILS OF LATEST EASTERN PROPOSALS IN FOLLOW-UP COVERAGE. THEY CONTEND THAT WARSAW PACT HAS CONFIDENTIAL

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NOW TAKEN KEY WESTERN DEMANDS INTO CONSIDERATION, NAMELY

SEQUENCE AND SIZE OF REDUCTIONS. SOME WESTERN MEDIA REACTION HAS ALREADY TENDED TO ACCEPT TENTATIVELY SOME OF THESE EASTERN CONTENTIONS. TO COUNTER POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THIS EASTERN LINE, THE FOLLOWING POINTS CAN BE DRAWN ON IN CONTACTS WITH PRESS. THEY REPRESENT AN ADAPTATION FOR PUBLIC USE OF MAJOR ARGUMENTS ALREADY MADE IN OFFICIAL RESPONSES TO THE LATEST EASTERN PROPOSALS.

3. START TEXT

1. THE QUESTION OF, WHEN, AND UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS, THE ELEVEN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE TROOP REDUCTION NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD REDUCE THEIR FORCES HAS BEEN ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL ISSUES OF DISCUSSION BETWEEN EAST AND WEST.

2. THE EASTERN DRAFT TREATY OF NOVEMBER 8, 1973, ENVISAGED THAT, IN EACH OF THREE SUCCESSIVE STAGES OF REDUCTION, ALL PARTICIPANTS WOULD REDUCE THEIR FORCES SIMULTANEOUSLY.

3. RECENTLY, THE EAST HAS SUGGESTED THAT THE FIRST AND SECOND OF THESE REDUCTION STAGES COULD EACH BE DIVIDED INTO TWO SUBSTAGES FOR THE PURPOSE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF REDUCTIONS, WITH THE US AND USSR TAKING THEIR REDUCTIONS IN THE FIRST SIX MONTHS OF 1975 AND 1976 RESPECTIVELY, WHILE THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD REDUCE THEIR FORCES IN THE SECOND HALF OF 1975 AND 1976.

4. AS FAR AS AMOUNTS OF REDUCTIONS ARE CONCERNED, THE EAST HAS NOT CHANGED ITS ORIGINAL PROPOSAL THAT, IN THE FIRST STAGE, EACH SIDE WOULD TAKE A TOTAL REDUCTION OF 20,000 MEN AND THAT, IN THE SECOND STAGE, EAST AND WEST WOULD EACH REDUCE THEIR FORCES BY 5 PERCENT. AS REGARDS THE APPORTIONING OF THE 20,000 FIRST STAGE REDUCTIONS ON EACH SIDE, THE EAST HAS RECENTLY PROPOSED THAT THE US AND USSR SHOULD EACH REDUCE THEIR FORCES BY 10,000 MEN; WITH THE REMAINING 10,000 MEN ON EACH SIDE DISTRIBUTED AMONG THE OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OF THAT ALLIANCE.

5. IN MAKING THESE PROPOSALS, THE EAST HAS NOT CHANGED THE SUBSTANCE OF ITS POSITION ON ANY BASIC ISSUE.  
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AS BEFORE, ALL WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE REQUIRED TO SPECIFY THE TIMING AND AMOUNT OF THEIR REDUCTIONS BEFORE ANY REDUCTIONS ARE MADE BY THE EAST. AS BEFORE, THE RATIO OF EAST-WEST REDUCTIONS WOULD CONTINUE TO BE ONE OF EQUAL NUMBERS OF EQUAL PERCENTAGES, WITH THE RESULT THAT, IF THIS APPROACH WERE ACCEPTED, THE LARGE EXISTING EASTERN ADVANTAGE IN GROUND FORCES AND TANKS WOULD BE CONTRACTUALIZED IN AN AGREEMENT.

6. FOR THESE REASONS THE WEST CONSIDERS THAT THE EASTERN PROPOSALS AMOUNT TO PURELY PROCEDURAL MODIFICATIONS WITHOUT SUBSTANTIVE CONTENT.

7. ON THE ISSUE OF THE SEQUENCE OF REDUCTIONS, THE WESTERN POSITION IS QUITE DIFFERENT FROM WHAT THE EAST HAS PROPOSED. IT IS THAT US-SOVIET REDUCTIONS SHOULD PRECEDE, NOT MERELY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF REDUCTIONS BY THE OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, BUT ALSO SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS AS TO THE DETAILS OF THESE REDUCTIONS.

8. AS FAR AS A GENERAL COMMITMENT TO REDUCTIONS IS CONCERNED, THE NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS HAVE ALREADY STATED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO REDUCE THEIR GROUND FORCES IN A SECOND PHASE OF REDUCTIONS LEADING TO A COMMON CEILING ON GROUND FORCE MANPOWER. HOWEVER, BEFOE NON-US WESTERN PARTICIPANTS CAN MAKE MORE SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS AS TO THE AMOUNT AND TIMING OF THEIR REDUCTIONS, THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS OF CONFIDENCE MUST EXIST. IN THE WESTERN VIEW, SUBSTANTIAL SOVIET REDUCTIONS IN A FIRST PHASE OF US-SOVIET REDUCTIONS ALONG THE LINES PROPOSED BY THE NATO ALLIES IS THE ESSENTIAL PREREQUISITE FOR SUCH A CLIMATE OF CONFIDENCE

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FROM US REP MBFR

9. THE WEST THINKS IT JUSTIFIABLE TO ASK FOR PRIOR REDUCTIONS BY THE USSR, AND WITH IT, THE USA. FIRST, BECAUSE THE US AND USSR ARE THE TWO LARGEST MILITARY POWERS WITH FORCES IN THE AREA. IT IS INCUMBENT ON THEM, AS SUPERPOWERS, TO BEGIN THE REDUCTION PROCESS BY SUBSTANTIAL WITHDRAWALS OF THEIR OWN FORCES FROM THE AREA. SECONDLY, UNDER THE WESTERN PROPOSAL, US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS IN A FIRST PHASE WOULD BE ACCCOMPANIED BY EASTERN AGREEMENT TO A COMMON CEILING ON GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AS THE FINAL OUTCOME OF REDUCTIONS.

10. A FIRST PHASE OF US-SOVIET REDUCTIONS ON THESE LINES WILL PROVIDE THE NECESSARY ASSURANCE TO THE OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS THAT THEIR REDUCTIONS WILL CONTRIBUTE TO ELIMINATION OF THE PRESENT IMBALANCE BETWEEN THE GROUND FORCES OF EAST AND WEST AND CREATE A MORE STABLE SITUATION  
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IN THE AREA. THIS ASSURANCE WILL PERMIT THEM TO PROCEED TO THE REDUCTION OF THEIR OWN FORCES.

11. THE RECENT EASTERN PROPOSALS DO NOT REPRESENT SUBSTANTIVE MOVEMENT TOWARDS THE WESTERN POSITION OR TAKE ACCOUNT OF WESTERN CONCERNS ON EITHER OF THESE TWO ISSUES. THE EAST HAS TO A LIMITED EXTENT ACCEPTED THE WESTERN VIEW THAT THE US AND USSR SHOULD BE TREATED DIFFERENTLY FROM OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. BUT THUS FAR, THIS ACCEPTANCE HAS NOT GONE BEYOND A DISTINCTION IN THE PROCEDURES OF IMPLEMENTATION. IN PARTICULAR, IT HAS NOT LED THE EAST TO WHAT, IN THE WESTERN VIEW, IS THE LOGICAL COROLLARY OF THE DISTINCTION; NAMELY, THAT US AND SOVIET REDUCTIONS SHOULD PRECEDE DETAILED COMMITMENTS BY OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ON THEIR REDUCTIONS.

12. SIGNIFICANTLY, UNDER THE NEW EASTERN PROCEDURAL MODIFICATIONS, BOTH US-SOVIET REDUCTIONS AND EAST-WEST REDUCTIONS WOULD STILL BE BY EQUAL NUMBERS OR EQUAL PERCENTAGES. ACCEPTANCE OF THIS REDUCTION APPROACH WOULD, AS ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES HAVE TOLD THE EAST, MEAN CONTRACTUALIZING IN AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT THE SIGNIFICANT WARSAW PACT SUPERIORITY IN GROUND FORCES AND MAIN BATTLE TANKS IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. IT CONSEQUENTLY REMAINS

UNACCEPTABLE TO THE WEST. END TEXT. RESOR

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